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THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD,
AND THE PLACE OF FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION IN HUMAN RIGHTS1
PAOLO G. CA ROZZA
“[T]he centrality of religious freedom to 
 the protection of human dignity is, in fact, 
 key to the coherence and viability of the entire 
human rights project.”
There is, of course, a long and deep philosophical debate about 
the relationship of the right to the good, and the priority of one 
over the other.2 We can see some of it in the other articles of this 
volume, such as David S. Crawford’s critique of John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism. Some of that literature also offers important 
theological insights that lead to powerful critiques of the meta-
physical premises of the liberal claim to separate right from good 
1. Paper delivered at the conference, “Dignitatis Humanae and the Redis-
covery of Religious Freedom,” at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute at The 
Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., 21–23 February 2013.
2. See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and 
Its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1984). 
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at all. My own discipline and method, however, is that of a ju-
rist, and therefore I do not pretend to engage those discussions 
directly. Instead, I propose to approach the problem from the 
specific perspective of someone who both inside and outside of 
the academy has been particularly concerned with the idea and 
practice of human rights. This has at least two implications for 
my discussion here. First, I will be reasoning about and from the 
starting point of legal experience; second, I am necessarily con-
cerned in the end with trying to identify those practices—those 
rules and principles, processes, and institutions—by which we 
can best order our common life toward the protection of human 
dignity and the flourishing of the community. 
My aim will be to show that, to the extent that the proj-
ect of defining and protecting human rights in the post-World 
War II era has in fact represented a systematic effort to place the 
priority of rights over the good, it has both failed on its own 
terms and also can become quite dangerous to human dignity 
and liberty. From that perspective, the endorsement and deploy-
ment of the language on concepts of human rights in Dignitatis 
humanae and contemporaneous or subsequent magisterial docu-
ments, can be seen as puzzling and perhaps problematic. At the 
same time, there is another, more limited, way to understand 
and to pursue the legal and political protection of human rights 
in practice that is more defensible and coherent, as a recognition 
and respect for the structural openness of the human person to 
the truth, and as an articulation of certain aspects of the com-
mon good. This latter approach to human rights can hold, if at 
all, only insofar as there is a robust primacy given to the right of 
religious freedom within the canon of human rights. In this way, 
the centrality of religious freedom to the protection of human 
dignity is, in fact, key to the coherence and viability of the entire 
human rights project.
Let me begin with the birth of the contemporary ef-
fort to articulate a global ethic of human rights after 1945. This 
was not, of course, the beginning of the idea of human rights as 
such, which has a much longer history, a history that predates 
Enlightenment liberalism by at least two centuries.3 The mid-
3. See Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, 
Natural Law, and Church Law 1150–1625 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997).
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twentieth century, however, witnessed the first attempt to arrive 
at a shared agreement about the basic principles of human rights 
across a plurality of different cultural contexts, religious tradi-
tions, and theoretical premises. The story of the genesis of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is well known, 
and Mary Ann Glendon and others have narrated in rich detail 
how the individuals involved in the drafting and adoption of 
the Universal Declaration succeeded in such an unprecedented 
effort.4 As that record shows, the generation of jurists, scholars, 
and politicians who drew up and secured approval for the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights knew very well that they 
all came to the discussion with profoundly incompatible first 
principles—they were Catholics and Muslims and secular lib-
erals and socialists and Confucians, just for starters. Famously, 
whenever he was asked how it was possible that adherents of 
such radically opposed philosophies could reach agreement on a 
declaration of fundamental rights, Jacques Maritain—himself a 
Catholic, Thomist philosopher, and diplomat who was heavily 
involved in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights—liked to say, “Yes, we agree about the rights, but on 
condition that no one asks us why. It is with the ‘why’ that all 
the disagreements begin.”5
In other words, the whole enterprise of the Universal 
Declaration can be said to be constructed not on any one tradi-
tion of rights—whether that of Enlightenment liberalism or of 
the pre-modern Catholic idea of natural rights—but instead on 
the basis of a deliberate abstention from strong agreement about 
foundational principles. The basis for their consensus on a decla-
ration of basic human rights was neither a substantive agreement 
about foundations nor the discovery of a transcendent global 
ethic that unified them. Rather, their project was based on a 
more modest and limited aim: to reach a practical consensus on 
the articulation of human rights while setting aside the goal of 
attaining any thicker consensus about where those rights come 
from, why we should regard them as pertaining to human per-
4. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2002).
5. Jacques Maritain, introduction to Human Rights Comments and Interpreta-
tions, symposium, ed. UNESCO (London: Wingate, 1949), 9.
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sons, or what the underlying goods are to which they relate. The 
human rights enterprise is built on a limited practical agree-
ment, tout court.
In that sense, the Universal Declaration, and by implica-
tion the entire edifice of contemporary human rights law and 
institutions, could be characterized as a systematic attempt to 
prioritize the right over the good, to bracket and set aside any 
comprehensive accounts of justice, the human person, or the 
common good, in favor of a catalogue of rights within which 
any number of competing and incompatible world-views could 
coexist. On this account, the Universal Declaration might be 
seen as, at best, a paradigm of Rawlsian public reason (twenty-
three years before A Theory of Justice), and at worst a recipe for 
absolute relativism with regard to the meaning and ends of hu-
man existence.
But there are at least three reasons why this view of what 
the Universal Declaration is and does is not tenable, especially 
over time.
First, if it were true that the Universal Declaration of 
Rights was entirely protean in its ability to accommodate any 
conception of persons and society and the relationships of justice 
among them, then of course the effort would be self-defeating 
from the start because it would not in fact represent a cross-cul-
tural agreement on anything at all. So we have to see right away 
that notwithstanding the method of bare agreement on a limited 
set of practical principles, the Universal Declaration does embody 
at least some important anthropological premises. For instance, 
it appeals to inherent human dignity as the foundation of rights 
(see the Preamble and Articles 1 and 22). In doing so it makes 
clear that every human person has a moral value that is ontologi-
cal and precedes the state and positive law, and to which all pub-
lic authority must therefore be accountable. The agreement over 
which rights to include or exclude in the document also depends 
on unstated premises, notwithstanding the drafters’ incapacity to 
discuss “why.” The Universal Declaration does not include the 
right not to be alienated from the fruits of one’s labor, for exam-
ple, but it does include a recognition that the family must be pro-
tected as the fundamental unit of society—thus there is decided-
ly, even if only implicitly, an affirmation of a certain conception 
of the good in the enumeration of these rights rather than others. 
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 Still, one could reasonably respond that despite these 
choices, the Universal Declaration is still quite minimalistic in 
its embodiment of a substantive vision of the human person and 
of society, and still quite capacious in its ability to accommodate 
multiple competing and indeed even incommensurable under-
standings of the good. In this sense it still prioritizes to a sub-
stantial degree the right over the good (or at least any “thick” 
conception of the good).
There is, however, a second reason—and, over time, a 
much more important and powerful reason—why the universal 
human rights project is inevitably self-defeating in its pretense 
of prioritizing rights while bracketing thicker conceptions of the 
good: its principles are intended to be a guide to practice; it is meant 
to be implemented, not merely to sit on a library shelf. What nec-
essarily happens when the principles of the Universal Declaration 
are called upon in practice, in the experience of law as a social re-
ality governing and coordinating the common life of a commu-
nity? In the interpretation and application of the rights, the am-
bivalence of the norms must be reduced in favor of specification 
of the rights, and in that process clear choices emerge from what 
were previously unresolved disagreements and contested premises. 
  This happens in a multitude of forms, all very familiar to 
any observer of the contemporary practice of human rights law:
?? What is the scope of a given right? For instance, does the 
right to found a family extend to the use of artificial meth-
ods of reproduction? Does the right to life include the right 
to water, food, and health care?
?? When should “new rights” be recognized, in virtue of the 
same human dignity that justifies the initial list? Should 
there be a recognized right to development, or to a healthy 
environment, for example?
?? How do we resolve conflicting claims of rights? Where does 
my right to freedom of expression end and your right to 
privacy and to honor begin? When should freedom of asso-
ciation give way to equality? These judgments require some 
sort of hierarchy of value within the catalogue of rights.
?? Who is the holder of a right, and who is the bearer of any 
correlative duty? Is my right to be free from cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment only opposable to the state, 
or also to other private parties? Does the state have an obli-
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gation to protect my rights against the violence of another 
person? Can citizenship in a political community ever be a 
necessary requisite for the exercise of a basic human right? 
?? For what reasons and under what circumstances can we 
limit or derogate from a human right? Is it ever justifiable 
to torture a person? When can a religious practice that is 
harmful to public morality or public health be restricted? 
Note that these are not “hard cases,” nor just hypotheti-
cal exercises pondered in the tower of academia. They are the 
questions of every day work in human rights, cases that we are 
called to resolve in the fora of public life. In addressing any of 
them we see judgments having to be made, more or less explic-
itly, about the underlying conceptions of the good—the good of 
persons, the common good of communities, and the relation-
ships between them. 
Over time, the scope and content of the broad and open 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in-
crementally acquire greater specification and “positivization,” 
whether by subsequent treaties and declarations or by the adjudi-
cation of concrete disputes. As they do so, choices must be made 
at least passively among the competing and incommensurable 
premises that the looser boundaries of the Universal Declaration 
had initially drawn. And so eventually, a stronger conception of 
the good (although not necessarily a consistent or coherent one) 
becomes manifest as the foundation and supporting structure of 
any more fully articulated practice of human rights.
A third and quite different reason that the initial pretense 
of affirming fundamental human rights without any thick ac-
count of the good is ultimately self-defeating is that it is incapable 
of sustaining itself as a social and political practice. What gen-
erates the conditions and commitments necessary to sustaining 
the pre-political values that are needed to make the law effec-
tive? Even Jürgen Habermas—he of “constitutional patriotism” 
and the self-sufficiency of the liberal legal state—came to ac-
knowledge that: “An abstract solidarity, mediated by the law, 
arises among citizens only when the principles of justice have 
penetrated more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations 
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in a given culture.”6 In short, the thin practical consensus on 
human rights alone is not self-sustaining; it depends on deeper 
sources of consensus about the status and worth of human per-
sons and deeper sources of commitment to respecting that status 
and worth, because to generate a culture of respecting human 
dignity one needs a thicker understanding of what human dig-
nity is, where it comes from, and what responsibilities it entails 
for us as neighbors and fellow citizens.7
In short, the strategy of trying to construct a global law 
for protecting human dignity merely on the basis of a very thin 
practical consensus on rights prior to and prescinding from any 
(or any strong form of ) judgment about the good of human per-
sons and their communities is both incoherent and unsustainable 
over any length of time. In the meantime, though, it can and 
sometimes does result in a number of very troubling tangible 
consequences, that are all traceable in some degree to the thin-
ness of the practical agreement on which the human rights proj-
ect rests. I will try to be as synthetic as possible, but let me at least 
mention seven of these dangers.8
First, it contributes to the wide and enduring gap be-
tween the formal international legal norms and instruments of 
human rights law, on the one hand, and the local social, political, 
and cultural realities in which they are supposed to be operative 
in practice, on the other. This helps explain the very high de-
grees of noncompliance and ineffectiveness that we find in virtu-
ally all systems of international human rights law. 
Second, given that—as I have already pointed out—in 
the end it is impossible to avoid, at least passively, making judg-
ments and decisions on the basis of the deeper and more contest-
ed premises about the nature of the human person and the mean-
ing of human life, acknowledging practical agreement alone only 
6. Jürgen Habermas, “Pre-Political Foundations of the Democratic Con-
stitutional State?” in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of 
Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 19.
7. See generally, Christopher McCrudden, ed., Understanding Human Dig-
nity (Oxford: The British Academy, forthcoming 2013).
8. See Paolo G. Carozza, “Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human 
Experience,” in Understanding Human Dignity, ed. Christopher McCrudden 
(Oxford: The British Academy, forthcoming 2013). 
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obscures the deeper differences that in fact persist. Bracketing the 
underlying assumptions about the good only makes those differ-
ences less transparent and therefore less subject to reasoned discus-
sion and debate. And from there the problems become more acute. 
 Third, the masking of whatever good is, nevertheless, 
in fact always in play in assertions of human rights. This opens 
the danger that the practice of human rights, rather than be-
ing oriented to the priority of the person, to which in principle 
an authentic regime of universal human rights aspires, becomes 
instead a Trojan horse for trading in ideologies. It distances the 
interpretation and development of the content of human rights 
from the reality of what is or is not conducive to human flour-
ishing in different times and places. Instead, it privileges highly 
contingent cultural and political preferences over genuine hu-
man experience.
Fourth, the practice of human rights also inevitably be-
comes reduced to an exercise of power, especially the power of 
a relatively circumscribed cultural elite. The assertion of human 
rights without a human good as their concrete reference point 
thus legitimates the very thing that human rights norms were 
originally supposed to limit and discipline. Control over the 
means of the institutions and processes of interpretation and ap-
plication of the rights determines in large part what gets defined 
or recognized as a human right, which human rights become 
developed or enforced, and which rights are forgotten or denied. 
The institutions of international and constitutional law (many 
of which are distinctly and deliberately removed from political 
accountability to any popular constituency) have enormous con-
trol over the definition and development of human rights, as do 
a small handful of non-governmental actors that have become 
players in it as well. The world of human rights thus sometimes 
resembles a rather tightly drawn oligarchy, in which dissent and 
difference are strictly limited. And like in many oligarchic sys-
tems, a well-financed effort to advance a particular right or rights 
can be quite effective because there is a relatively narrow elite 
that needs to be influenced.
Fifth, rights without the good foster a persistent cultural 
and historical amnesia. The circulation of human rights norms 
takes place without any real reference to the way that human 
dignity and the common good have been sought and worked out 
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in concrete ways within a variety of different human civilizations 
throughout history. Thus it encourages an ignorance of historical 
identity and a homogenization of cultures. There is no real place 
for the recognition of legitimate pluralism in the specification 
of basic principles of human rights. On the contrary, the ideol-
ogy of human rights traffic is generally hostile to the notion that 
human rights norms require great sensitivity and respect for the 
concrete social contexts in which human persons live and seek 
meaning and fulfillment.
Sixth, it elevates bureaucratic authority over practical 
reason and politics. It is an example of what Pierre Manent la-
ments as the “depoliticization” of our societies,9 because the dy-
namic of rights succeeds in removing more and more contested 
and difficult questions about the good of human persons and 
communities from the sphere of collective rational deliberation, 
and puts them in the hands of the staffs of institutions that are 
much more removed from the messy but necessary give-and-take 
of dialogue, persuasion, and decision in political communities. 
There is less need to appeal to the practical reason of others and 
to convince them that a particular course of justice is correct, if 
instead one can more conveniently discover or invent a right that 
removes the question from debate. 
Finally, without a good which human rights are derived 
and to which they refer, the idea of human rights increasing-
ly tends to be treated as encompassing the totality of the good. 
There is nothing else to which it is accountable as a limiting cri-
terion of its proper scope. Thus, rather than remain the limited 
instantiation of certain discrete aspects of the common good, 
it tends to colonize every aspect of social and personal life. In 
the insatiability of our human desire, the object of every desire 
becomes a human right, and every limitation of desire is then a 
violation of our rights.
Against all of this, what are we to do with the language 
of rights? There is a great temptation merely to throw it all over-
board. And yet, it is also true that the language of rights represents 
a powerfully human longing for justice and for freedom. From its 
earliest emergence in the sixteenth-century encounter of Europe 
9. Pierre Manent, A World Beyond Politics?: A Defense of the Nation-State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 63.
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with the peoples of the New World, the language of human rights 
has expressed recognition of the universal nature of the human 
person, of the membership of each in a common human family, 
and of our responsibilities for the well-being of our brothers and 
sisters.10 And even today, for all of the corruptions of dignity and 
justice and the common good that are perpetrated in the name 
of a free-floating relativism of rights, vastly more claims of rights 
around the world do spring directly from the hearts of those men 
and women and children who suffer from massive and undeniable 
injustices, from systematic policies of oppression and violence and 
neglect. We may in the end conclude that the rights paradigm is 
a fatally flawed way of dealing with these urgent and elementary 
human needs, but their reality demands that if we are unwilling 
to speak the language of rights then we must have something else 
on offer—and in particular, something that takes into account 
with Christian realism the permanent threat that is represented 
by any human beings who control, and who will at times abuse, 
the concentrated powers of the modern state. For now, no other 
alternative is obvious.
So, can we instead hope to tame the hubris of the human 
rights project in some way, to help direct it toward a more authen-
tic good and to limit the pathologies to which it is congenitally 
susceptible? This is where Dignitatis humanae and the “rediscovery 
of religious freedom” are indispensible. 
Is the explicit endorsement of rights, of freedom from co-
ercion, and of constitutional limits on the exercise of public power 
in Dignitatis humanae as well as other contemporaneous documents 
of the Council and the popes merely a mistake of epochal pro-
portions? Was it a historical blunder that the Council “greet[ed] 
with joy” as a sign of the times the recognition of the right to 
religious freedom in international documents like the Universal 
Declaration?11 Or perhaps does the different way of conceiving 
the relationship between the right and the good, between freedom 
and truth, that we find in Dignitatis humanae give us a tool for tem-
pering (note, I do not say “curing”) the vices of the rights project?
10. See Paolo G. Carozza, “From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a 
Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quar-
terly 25 (2003): 281–313. 
11. Dignitatis humanae, 15.
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Like the many magisterial pronouncements using the lan-
guage of rights that came before it, like Lumen gentium and Pacem 
in terris in its time, like the language of rights deployed routine-
ly in the encyclicals and speeches of John Paul II and Benedict 
XVI, the discourse of rights in Dignitatis humanae does not merely 
conform to or appropriate a liberal idea and its premises. There 
is convergence and overlap in key ways, to be sure, but also a 
critical distance and tension between the paradigmatic Enlight-
enment assertions of rights and that of the Catholic tradition.12 
 Most critically, the rights pertaining to the human person 
in the tradition of thought in which Dignitatis humanae is situated 
are not the rights of the person who chooses his ends and his good, 
who constructs his destiny, or who is defined essentially as an au-
tonomous monad. It is instead a tradition of speaking about rights 
that strictly links the person to a destiny that is given and an objec-
tive good that is to be acknowledged and accepted in freedom. The 
human person is by nature a seeker of the truth, someone structur-
ally oriented toward the quest to encounter his destiny. This basic 
premise of Dignitatis humanae, while pervasively evident through-
out the document, is expressed very succinctly in this passage: 
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons—that is, 
beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore 
privileged to bear personal responsibility—that all men 
should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a 
moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. 
They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, 
and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of 
truth. However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a 
manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy 
immunity from external coercion as well as psychological 
freedom. Therefore the right to religious freedom has its 
foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person, 
but in his very nature. In consequence, the right to this 
immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live 
up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it 
and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided 
that just public order be observed.13
12. Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Church, Human 
Rights, and Democracy: Convergence and Conflict With the Modern State,” 
Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 15, no. 3 (2012): 15–43.
13. Dignitatis humanae, 2. 
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Is the distinctive understanding of the origins and nature 
of fundamental human rights in the Catholic tradition, as exem-
plified here, plausibly compatible with the enterprise of human 
rights as it is concretely manifested and practiced in the legal and 
political experience of the world today? 
When one gives the Universal Declaration a short glance, 
it is not unreasonable to think that the answer may be a tentative 
“yes.” When read as an integrated whole and not deconstructed 
merely into fragmentary echoes of human dignity, the Universal 
Declaration is certainly more conducive to being interpreted in 
the light of a Catholic anthropology than most people realize. 
Explicitly rooted in human dignity, it offers the portrait of a 
person formed in the family, constituted by relationships, hav-
ing duties and responsibilities, embodied with material needs as 
well as a thirst for freedom.14 The Universal Declaration can be 
characterized as a noble attempt—even if imperfect as such at-
tempts will always be—to provide a helpful degree of specifica-
tion of certain aspects of the universal common good.15 And in 
fact, it would be difficult to deny that its provisions, with few 
exceptions if any, are necessary to the protection of dignity or 
conducive to a flourishing human life. The historical record of 
the role that Catholics played in the genesis of the Universal Dec-
laration is not to be dismissed entirely, either16—that explains, in 
part, how much some of the document’s articulations of specific 
principles, such as the protection of the family and the contours 
of religious freedom, tend to be much more hospitable to Catho-
lic social doctrine than are, for example, the French Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man or the U.S. Bill of Rights. In 
short, I do not think it was a confused blunder for John Paul II to 
have regarded it as “one of the highest expressions of the human 
conscience of our time,”17 or for Benedict XVI to emphasize how 
14. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” https://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/.
15. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 214.
16. Glendon, A World Made New, 15.
17. John Paul II, Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United 
Nations Organization (New York, 5 October 1995), http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1995/october/documents/hf_ jp-ii_
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 13
it represents powerfully the conscience of man and the longing of 
the human heart for freedom.18
At the same time, of course, we saw earlier how the 
Universal Declaration is deliberately written to avoid represent-
ing any single strong conception of the good, and also how in 
any case the further specification and instantiation of rights in 
practice over time can, and has, superimposed other concepts of 
rights onto the framework of the Universal Declaration—some 
of which profoundly diverge from any Catholic vision. It would 
therefore be truly naïve and contradictory to suggest that we can 
content ourselves with a soft and generic compatibility of the 
rights project with the Catholic tradition. We will need to go a 
little deeper than that.
Maritain and his contemporaries knew as much, and in 
fact said clearly that consensus around a limited set of practi-
cal principles did not obviate the more difficult task of seeking 
greater common understanding of the underlying reasons and 
foundations of human rights. Although his method of working 
from a practical consensus is often cited, it is less commonly re-
membered that Maritain himself insisted that the practical con-
sensus was nothing other than a starting point for inquiry, not an 
end point. It needed to lead to a further reflection on and engage-
ment with the “why” question. It was meant to be a provocation 
to serious questioning and dialogue about the ends of human life, 
not the closure of that question. The strategy of practical agree-
ment, the philosopher Richard McKeon stressed, would merely 
provide a “framework within which divergent philosophical, re-
ligious, and even economic, social and political theories might be 
entertained and developed.”19 In other words, for at least some of 
the drafters and intellectual supporters of the Universal Declara-
tion, the focus on practical agreement on principles and institu-
tions was merely a methodological tool for engaging the chal-
spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html.
18. Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions Organization (New York, 18 April 2008), http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_
spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html.
19. UNESCO, ed., Human Rights Comments and Interpretations, symposium, 
(London: Wingate, 1949), 35; Glendon, A World Made New, 147.
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lenge of divergent first principles, not a roadblock to the inquiry. 
It was not presumed to be a sufficient permanent basis for the 
recognition and protection of universal human rights. Instead it 
was to be a provisional and partial overlap of commitments on 
the basis of which we would need to work (hard) toward a deeper 
understanding of the basis of that practice. At its best, the effort 
to reach practical agreement was a method to provoke, to force 
open, a more vital debate about the foundations too.
From this vantage point, two further observations then 
come into view. First, on this account it would not be quite right 
to say that the human rights project necessarily places the right 
before the good. At least, it is not necessary that it be regarded as 
doing so in a systematic and comprehensive way. Rather, it does 
so in a very partial, highly contingent, and limited way. It can 
be read at least in part as embodying a recognition that the good 
of the human being is the good of the freely seeking person, of 
the person structurally oriented toward a search for truth and 
needing the capacity to adhere to that truth in conscience and 
freedom. It places limits on public authority so that that search, 
in conscience and truth, can be pursued not only individually 
but also communally, without coercion from the state. In oth-
er words, the good itself that is embodied requires that certain 
rights must be recognized and protected that permit persons to 
search, individually and collectively, for the good, to communi-
cate it among one another, and to adhere to it in such a way that 
it generates their acting and being in various other ways. There is 
in this approach a paradox of sorts: it is a conception of the good 
that prescribes that certain kinds of right be given contingent 
priority, in particular with respect to the power of the state to 
coerce recognition of and adherence to the good.
The second observation follows from there. If the coher-
ence, meaning, and good of rights is fundamentally about the 
recognition of the structural need of the human person to be 
able to seek and adhere to the ultimate meaning of his life, to 
communicate and transmit it, and to generate a cultural life (in 
the broad sense that Antonio López describes in his paper in this 
volume), then human rights must be first and foremost oriented 
toward a recognition and protection of the religious sense of the 
human person, and Dignitatis humanae (among many other state-
ments in the tradition of the Church) is entirely correct that re-
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ligious freedom takes on a singular importance to the integrity 
of the whole edifice. In a very strong way, freedom of religion is 
the heart of the enterprise, the fulcrum around which it turns; 
it is the “queen” of human rights. Without an understanding of 
human rights that places the religious sense of man (as individual 
and in community) at the center, the other freedoms do not make 
sense and are destined ultimately to be subordinated to some im-
position of power or another, as outlined earlier and as we see 
around us today. In particular, human rights risk becoming the 
tools of a totalizing control rather than the expression of the hu-
man heart’s structural longing for freedom. Recognition of the 
religious dimensions of human nature is the only thing that puts 
the dignity of man beyond the dominion of every earthly power.
Unifying these two observations, one can say that the 
limited and contingent way in which the rights project can jus-
tifiably be said to place the right before the good depends for its 
justification and coherence on maintaining a robust and struc-
tural openness to man’s search for the comprehensive good of his 
life, one that is thrown open to the transcendent and that will 
have broad implications for the ordering of his life both alone and 
together with others. And conversely, where religious liberty is 
suppressed, one should expect therefore that the rest of the hu-
man rights enterprise will eventually decay, defeating its own 
stated aspirations, and become quite oppressive, in all of the ways 
that I described.
It is worth noting that this reading of the relationship of 
religious liberty to human rights, prompted by Dignitatis huma-
nae, is supported also by some of the best available empirical evi-
dence that we have today. We know that the respect for freedom 
of religion is an extremely sensitive and accurate indicator of a 
state’s respect for other fundamental rights and freedoms.20 We 
know that in societies where religious practice is suppressed, vio-
lence tends to be greater,21 while promotion of religious freedom 
is strongly correlated with a reduction of inter-religious con-
20. Brian Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious 
Persecution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 206.
21. Ibid., 212.
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flict.22 These are not by themselves definitive reasons for regard-
ing religious liberty as having the special status among human 
rights that Dignitatis humanae and other documents claim for it, 
but they do provide critical support for that view. Catholic social 
teaching is grounded in reason and in what corresponds in expe-
rience to the good and flourishing of human life, therefore such 
evidence is important.
And this in turn gives us additional reason to be deeply 
concerned over the erosion of religious liberty, even in coun-
tries like ours where it has long been protected. Arguing for the 
centrality of religious liberty is neither special pleading for self-
regarding and particular interests, nor exaggerated alarmism. It 
is essential to the protection of the basic human dignity of every-
one in society. 
In conclusion let me return to the beginning. As I 
stressed at the outset, I have tried here to reason neither as a phi-
losopher nor theologian, but from the experience of the law and 
toward the concrete and present need to order society in ways 
most conducive to the common good. I have thus deliberately 
avoided entering directly into any discussion of the metaphysical 
premises that may underlie liberalism, constitutional democracy, 
rights, or religious liberty. Still, at least some readers will regard 
my attempt to rescue the place of religious liberty, and through it 
to reclaim some scope for the recognition and protection of fun-
damental human rights more generally, as fatally flawed because 
it inevitably imports the foundations of its own undoing.23 That 
may in the end prove to be true. But in a world where, today and 
not merely when seen on an eschatological horizon, the demands 
of justice are urgent and the challenge of pluralism in society 
is a raw fact, and where we are (as Glenn W. Olsen cogently 
points out in his essay in this volume) inexorably situated in a 
specific historical and cultural context of which we were neither 
the makers nor are the masters, then what else have we to use? 
Certainly, if even the struggle for religious liberty is destined to 
fail in the end, there remains the possibility of prophetic witness 
22. Thomas Farr, World of Faith and Freedom: Why International Religious 
Liberty is Vital to American National Security (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 66.
23. See for example the essay by David S. Crawford in this volume.
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and ultimately martyrdom. But in the meantime there is also 
the fact that the Church, as the historically extended presence 
of Christ in history, is generative of a new reality and a new hu-
manity.24 And so if for no other reason than that the freedom of 
the Church represents the only possibility for something authen-
tically human to enter into our broken world, I would suggest 
that fighting for religious liberty is well worth our while. 
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